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  The author conducts experiments examining fairness preferences (Andreoni and Miller, 
2002) and compares cash versus extra credit points as the reward medium.  Additionally, he 
explores the role that classroom experiment timing—over the course of a semester—can have on 
outcomes.  The results show that subjects are just as rational, if not more so, when the motivation 
is class points rather than cash.  Also, preference classifications show that subjects are 
significantly more likely to be Selfish (and less likely to be Utilitarian) when the experiment is 
conducted early in the academic semester.  One possible explanation is that is that the ultimate 
value of an extra credit point is more uncertain early in the semester, thus leading risk-averse 
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1)  Introduction 
  Experimental economics has proven a valuable tool for classroom instruction.  Not only 
can classroom experiments be enjoyable for both students and instructors, but there is also 
evidence indicating that experiments can improve student comprehension of important 
economics concepts (Frank, 1997: Emerson and Taylor, 2004).  Many instructors who conduct 
classroom experiments use class points (or extra credit points) as the reward medium.
1  Because 
a large body of experimental economics literature is often accessed for classroom discussion 
and/or comparison with outcomes from a similar class experiment, it is important to understand 
if differences exist between comparable research (i.e., cash) and classroom (i.e., extra credit) 
experiments.  The potential difference between experimental outcomes comparing cash versus 
classroom credit (i.e., point) is relatively understudied.  If the reward medium affects 
experimental outcomes, then at least two points are worth highlighting.  First, students should be 
made aware of what differences in results might be expected if the experiment were motivated 
with cash versus points.  Secondly, if the reward medium matters, then this may provide valuable 
insights into naturally-occurring decision environments that are primarily motivated by non-
monetary incentives. 
  An additional issue that arises in the use of classroom points experiments is the timing of 
the experiment over the course of the academic session.  It would seem that there has been no 
discussion in the experimental economics or educational community as to whether it matters to 
conduct the same experiment early versus late in the semester, for example.  This is not an 
irrelevant detail.  For example, if one conducts an experiment early in the semester, the potential 
value of a given number of class points may not be well-known.  Late in the semester, however, 
                                                 
1 Other reward-medium options are to pay the subjects cash (or randomly select one subject to receive a cash payoff 
based on the experimental outcome), or to just conduct the experiment hypothetically. 
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it becomes more certain how valuable a given amount of extra points may be.  In effect, payoff 
uncertainty may be present if conducting a “points” experiment early in the session, and so one 
might expect risk-averse students to behave more selfishly over classroom points. 
  This purpose of this paper is not to provide an exhaustive comparison of lab experiments 
and comparable classroom experiments.  Rather, this paper presents the results from classroom 
experiments conducted using the well-known Andreoni and Miller (2002) design to examine 
preferences for altruism.  Because their experiment examines a general issue of “fairness” 
preferences, it is likely to be of significant interest in a typical economics principles class.  I 
replicate the Andreoni and Miller (2002) cash-reward data and compare this to classroom data 
generated using extra credit points as the reward medium.  The same experiment is also 
conducted in different classes either early or late in the semester to examine the effect of 
experiment timing.   
In general, the cash experiment replication generates data that indicate less selfish 
subjects, on average, than what Andreoni and Miller (2002) report—about 40% of our data are 
best fit with a selfish-type utility function compared to 47% of their subjects.  When using extra-
credit points as the reward medium in classroom experiments, the results significantly differ 
based on experiment timing.  Early in the semester the experiment generates 50% selfish 
subjects, compared to only 24% selfish subjects when the exact same experiment is conducted 
late in the semester.  Subject rationality (as determined by the data’s consistency with WARP) is 
not significantly different in the classroom credit experiment compared to the cash experiments.  
Taken together, these data provide important evidence in support of subject rationality in non-
hypothetical classroom experiments.  They also provide equally important evidence that 
experiment timing and the reward medium can affect experimental results.   3
 
2.  The Reward Medium for Classroom Experiments. 
  Most discussion of reward media in classroom experiments revolves around the proper or 
fair way to provide salient incentives for classroom experiments.  Some teachers offer a small 
cash incentive, perhaps to the high payoff outcome in the experiment, or perhaps at a rate that 
pays only a fraction of experimental earnings (e.g., Holt, 1999).  If an instructor does not wish to 
pay classroom experimental monies out of his/her own pocket, and if the departmental budget is 
not open to such expenses, a natural alternative for those who desire a non-hypothetical decision 
environment is to offer some type of class points payoff.  Considerable concern has been 
expressed over the “fairness” of using grades in classroom experiments.  Commentary in Fels 
(1993), and Williams and Walker (1993) leans towards continued use of extra credit points when 
such points cannot constitute an overly large part of a student’s grade (e.g., no more than one full 
letter grade).  When the experiment includes some random element to the outcomes, assuming 
the entire payoff amount is not randomly determined, there are those who find the random 
element to the outcomes quite unfair (e.g., Stodder, 1998), while others find it quite parallel to 
how outcomes are sometime determined in the “real world” (e.g., Bell, 1993).  Though I do not 
recommend it, regular class points based on experiment outcomes is another alternative.  
Depending on the instructor, the use of regular points versus extra credit points may have little 
practical effect on the final grading scale, but the idea of having regular points—as opposed to 
“extra credit”—determined from experiment outcomes can be perceived as even more unfair.
2 
                                                 
2 It was, in fact, during a class points experiment several years ago where I had the unpleasant and unique 
experience of a student wielding a knife during a class cartel experiment when he discovered that he was “cheated” 
upon.  It is unclear whether the issue was the betrayal of his fellow cartel members, or the fact that such betrayal 
cost him valuable “regular” class points.  Though he quickly claimed he was “just joking”, I (and presumably no one 
else in class) never again looked at that student the same.   4
  The debate surrounding the use of class points will not abate, and it is not my purpose to 
convert anyone to the use of extra credit points as the reward medium for class experiments.  
But, because there is a large community of instructors who do use class points as a reward, the 
relevant question for this paper is whether or not the reward medium matters in terms of 
experimental outcomes.  Presumably, the answer to this question is of interest both to those who 
actively practice the use of class points experiments as well as those who have a general interest 
in the potential significance of the chosen reward medium for an experiment.  Isaac, Walker, and 
Williams (1994) conclude that results from their large-group public goods experiments are 
similar using class points or money incentives.  Controlled experimental conditions were not 
present in their study, given that the reward medium effect was not the objective of their 
research.  Li (1991), in an unpublished study, conducts a controlled comparison of the reward 
medium effect of cash versus extra credit points in public goods experiments and finds no 
significant difference in the data on several outcome measures.  One should not take this, 
however, to imply that the reward medium does not matter.  The present results are important in 
that they indicate that the timing of the experiment can confound the measurement of a reward 
medium effect.  Indeed, our results show later that, in the Andreoni and Miller (2002) altruism 
experiments we replicate, one set of classroom credit data is statistically no different from the 
cash experiment replication, while the other generates significantly different levels of altruism 
from the subjects. 
 
3.  The Experiments 
  As indicated in the introduction, the cash experiments replicate the design of Andreoni 
and Miller (2002).  Subjects make a series of eleven token allocation decisions designed to alter   5
the price of giving (see Appendix for the allocation decisions of the cash replication experiment.  
An additional appendix containing all instructions is available upon request).  A standard dictator 
game is one where the price of giving is one—that is, the slope of the budget constraint in 
payoff-to-self/payoff-to-other space is minus one.  The series of eleven token decisions represent 
a mix of standard dictator decisions and decisions where the price of giving is greater or less than 
one.   
After making all eleven allocation decisions, each subject’s decision sheet is randomly 
matched with those of two other anonymous subjects.  During the first pairing of decision sheets, 
one subject has a randomly selected allocation decision chosen, and the subject earns the amount 
determined by that subject’s own “hold” decision.  The earning from the first pairing are placed 
into the subject’s payoff envelope by an experimenter.  The decision sheets are then re-matched 
such that each subject is matched with a different subject, and this time those subjects who had 
earnings determined by their own randomly chosen “hold” decision receiving earnings based on 
the another subject’s “pass” decision for another randomly chosen allocation decision (and vice 
versa).  In this way, each subject had one payoff determined by one of their own “hold” 
decisions, and one payoff determined by someone else’s “pass” decision.  This was common 
knowledge, as was the fact that no subject would be matched twice with the same person, and 
that decisions would remain double-blind anonymous.  Decision sheet pairings, random 
allocation choices, and envelope stuffing were always supervised by a compensated volunteer 
subject who did not take part in the decision-making portion of the experiment. 
  This cash replication is conducted in two slightly distinct ways.  The first, called “double-
blind”, was a pure replication of the Andreoni and Miller (2002) experiment with their double-
blind payoff procedures, which I call the Cash Double-Blind treatment.  Here, neither the   6
subjects nor the experimenters could link any of the subject decisions or payoffs to an 
individual.
3  Of course, this type of double-blind experiment is not strictly possible when 
conducting a class points experiment, because the instructor must ultimately attach total 
experiment points to the individual student.  So, a second treatment, called Cash Quasi Double-
Blind, is also implemented.  Here, I implement a final step where, after receiving the payoff 
envelope, each subject shows her total cash payoff to the experimenter, which allows the 
experimenter to write total payoff amounts next to each subject’s name on an experiment list.  
Here, the experimenter knows the total payoff of each subject, but with this procedure he cannot 
identify the exact decisions made by any given subject (i.e., many different combinations of 
decisions, random pairings, and random decision choices could lead to the same final payoff 
amount).  Thus, the quasi double-blind procedure duplicates the extent of anonymity that can be 
preserved in the class points experiment, which allows one to separate out the difference in 
anonymity confound. 
  The points experiment is identical to the procedures of the Cash Quasi Double-Blind 
experiment, with the exception that payoffs were in terms of class points that would be added to 
the student’s Exam #1 (with no truncation at 100%).  Whereas the average payoff in the cash 
experiments was about $15 (for a 30 minute experiment), the average payoff in the points 
experiments was 9 class points.  This amount of points was nearly a full grade on the 100 point 
Exam #1, and in total this average payoff amounted to 2% of the final class points amount (450).  
With the plus-minus grading system, this implies that the average amount of class points paid out 
for this experiment was small, but non-trivial.  Over the course of a 16 week semester, this class 
                                                 
3 As in Andreoni and Miller (2002), the payoff envelopes were ultimately handed to subjects, based on claim check 
number, by an experimenter who arrived to perform this function after all payoff envelopes had already been filled 
with their payoffs.  So, the experimenter who handed payoff envelopes to actual subjects was unaware of the 
envelope contents, and those who were aware of the envelope contents did not see who received which envelope.   7
points experiment was conducted in some classes in week 3 of the semester (the Early Points 
treatment), while in distinct classes it was conducted in week 14 (the Late Points treatment).  The 
students had not yet completed Exam #1 in week 3, whereas all graded items except for the final 
exam had been completed in week 14 of the semester.  All classes were sections of the author’s 
microeconomic principles class—a required business class with varied student representation—
and both cash and points experiments were conducted by the same person. 
 
4.  Results 
  Two outcome measures are reported in order to compare the points experiments with the 
cash experiments, as well as for comparison with Andreoni and Miller (2002).  First, subject 
rationality is examined in Table 1.  The data are analyzed in terms of their consistency with the 
weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP).  The data in Andreoni and Miller (2002) are 
examined for their consistency with other revealed preference axioms, but the conclusions are 
not significantly altered if one focuses only on WARP violations.  The data in Table 1 report the 
number of violations of WARP at Afriat’s (1972) Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI) of .95.  
The CCEI is a measure of how much a budget constraint would have to shrink to avoid the 
preference axiom violation, and so we allow for the small amount of decision error of the 
magnitude suggested by Varian (1991) and reported in the Andreoni and Miller (2002) study. 
  The data in Table 1 indicate that subjects, in all treatments, are rational in some sense.  
Though the portion of WARP violations is, on average, a bit higher than in the Andreoni and 
Miller data, it is still the case that the vast majority of subject behavior is consistent with WARP.  
In comparing the two cash experiment treatments, we find that subject rationality is not 
significantly affected by the Quasi Double-Blind treatment (p>.10 for the binomial test).    8
Rationality is also not affected in the class points experiments by having the experiment early 
versus late in the semester (p>.10).  Subjects are, however, significantly more rational in the 
class points experiments than in Cash Double-Blind (p=.03 in comparing Cash Double-Blind 
with Class Points Late, and p=.10 in comparing Cash Double-Blind with Class Points Early).  
Recall, however, that the anonymity condition of the class experiments is more comparable to 
that in the Cash Quasi Double-Blind treatment, and we find no significant differences in subjects 
rationality in comparing Cash Quasi Double-Blind with either of the class points treatments 
(p>.10).
4  In sum, the only difference we find in subject rationality is that the replication of the 
anonymous cash experiments in Andreoni and Miller (2002) generates a lower percentage of 
rational subjects than in the other treatments.  At the very least, there is no evidence indicating 
that subjects are less rational in their preferences over fairness in extra credit point classroom 
experiments. 
  Table 2 shows the results from a categorization of preferences for self-payoff, xs, and 
other-payoff, xo, into one of three types:  preferences of the selfish type (U=xs) , Leontief 
preferences (U=min{xs , xo}), or perfect substitute preferences (U=xs+xo).  Andreoni and Miller 
examine both a strong and weak preference classification for each category, depending on 
whether choices exactly match those required by their respective utility function.  In what 
follows, we examine choices that do not exactly match these prototypical preferences by 
calculating the minimum sum of squared deviations of the subject’s tokens “held” amount for all 
allocation decisions from the amounts that one would hold for either of these three preference 
                                                 
4 For these binomial tests, the subject is the unit of observation, and I use the higher proportion of rational subjects 
in the pairwise comparison as the probability p for the test.  For example, in comparing Class Points Late with Cash 
Double-Blind, I use the binomial test to test the null hypothesis that the percentage of rational subjects in Cash 
Double-Blind is equal to 88%, which is the percentage of rational subjects in Class Points Late.   9
types.
5  The preference type that minimizes this sum of squared deviations is considered the 
subject’s “weak” preference type.  This comparison has the benefit of categorizing all subjects 
into one of these three categories, but it has the drawback of not differentiating between cases 
where a subject is relatively more or less close to a given preference type.  The portion of our 
subjects that exactly fit one of these three utility functions (i.e., the “strong” preference 
classification, 16%-26%) is somewhat less than is reported in the Andreoni and Miller (2002) 
data (43%).   
  The results from strong or weak preference-type categorizations, which are shaded in 
Table 2, highlight a main result from of this paper.  A large majority of the subjects are classified 
into Selfish or Leontieff preference types.  Subjects are somewhat less selfish in Cash Double-
Blind than what Andreoni and Miller (2002) report, but their results are largely replicated.  
Removing a small degree of subject anonymity in Cash Quasi Double-Blind generates somewhat 
more Leontieff, but less Perfect Substitute, preference types.  The data do not, however, indicate 
that subjects behave more selfishly (i.e., consistency with Selfish preferences) in Cash Double-
Blind compared to Cash Quasi Double-Blind.  This is at odds with Hoffman et al. (1994), which 
reports a well-known finding that subjects in dictator games behave more selfishly in a double-
blind treatment relative to traditional single-blind experiments where decisions are not 
anonymous to the experimenter.  If we examine only the subset of dictator games (budget sets 6, 
7, and 9 data at the bottom of Table 2), the data still fail to replicate this finding of Hoffman et al. 
(1994) (p=.02 for the one-tailed test of means of dictator offers in the two treatment).  However, 
the Cash Quasi Double-Blind is admittedly different (i.e., more anonymous with respect to the 
experimenter) than the baseline single-blind treatment that generated the more generous dictator 
                                                 
5 Budget sets 6, 7, and 9 (the dictator games) are removed from the preference classifications in Table 2 because any 
allocation of tokens is consistent with substitute preferences.   10
offers in Hoffman et al. (1994).  The present experiment merely shows that increasing the 
anonymity so that experimenters are blind to decisions and outcomes—not just blind to 
decisions—does not generate more selfish behavior in this more general environment. 
In examining the class points experiments, we find that subjects are somewhat more 
Selfish, less Leontieff, and less Utilitarian (i.e., substitute preference) for early-in-semester 
experiments relative to late-in-semester experiments.  That is, the distribution of preference types 
for the classroom experiment is more similar to the analogous cash experiment (i.e., Cash Quasi 
Double-Blind) when conducted early in the semester, but quite different when conducted late in 
the semester.  The one exception is the larger overall proportion of Substitute preference 
classifications in the Cash Double-Blind treatment.  This result is consistent with what one 
would conclude from examining the subset of class points data from the dictator game budget 
sets (budget sets 6, 7, and 9).  Dictator offers are higher late in the semester versus early in the 
semester for the points experiments (p=.00 for the two-sample test of mean differences in 
dictator offers). 
  A more formal and controlled econometric analysis is found in Table 3, which presents 
results from a multi-nomial logit analysis of the determinants of one’s preference type.  Marginal 
effects listed in Table 3 are all relative to the reference treatment Cash Double-Blind, and these 
results add more statistical support for the apparent treatment effects seen in Table 2.  Subjects 
have a significantly higher probability of being classified as Selfish in an early-semester 
classroom points experiment, relative to the Cash Double-Blind treatment, and they are less 
likely to be classified as having Substitute (Utilitarian) preferences.  They are significantly less 
likely to be classified as Selfish or Substitute in a late-semester classroom points experiment, but 
more likely to be Leontieff, compared to Cash Double-Blind.  Finally, subjects are more likely to   11
be classified as Leontieff, but less likely to be classified as having Substitute preferences, when 
partial experimenter anonymity is removed in Cash Quasi-Double-Blind.  Subjects behavior is 
most likely to fit the Substitute preference category in the Cash Double-Blind reference 
treatment, but the relative proportions of each classification in Table 2 indicate that the Selfish 
and Leontieff preference categories describe most of the subjects in any treatment.
6  The 
marginal effect patterns also support the Table 2 result that early-semester class points 
experiments are more likely to generate Selfish, and less likely to generate Utilitarian, subject 
behavior relative to late-semester points experiments. 
  These results indicate that classroom points can be a significant motivator for subjects.  
In fact, early in the semester subjects behave more selfishly over points than they would over 
cash in an otherwise similar experiment.  Perhaps the most surprising finding involves 
experiment timing.  Preferences over classroom points change significantly depending on the 
timing of the experiments during the academic session.  So, while points are certainly a salient 
reward, preferences towards them are not independent of factors that change over the course of 
the session.   
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
The main result to be made from these experiments is simple.  Though the results from a 
classroom experiment using extra credit points as the reward medium may replicate those from a 
cash experiment equivalent, they may also vary significantly given the timing of the class 
experiment.  To some, it may be a predictable result that students behave more selfishly when the 
experiment is conducted early in the semester, and they behave more egalitarian (Leontieff) late 
                                                 
6 The one exception is in Class Points Late, where a slightly higher percentage of subjects are classified as weak 
substitute preference types than weak selfish.  However, if one considers the strong preference classification, then 
no subjects in this treatment are classified strongly into the perfect substitute classification.   12
in the semester.  Two possible explanations arise.  First, the value of a given number of extra 
credit points is more uncertain early in the semester than late in the semester.  So, risk-averse 
students will seek to maximize own-points in the uncertain reward environment, resulting in 
more selfish behavior early in the semester.  Alternatively, a given class of students may form 
some social bonds later in the semester.  If this reduction in social distance generates less selfish 
behavior (see Hoffman et al., 1996; Cox and Deck, 2005), then one would also expect to see less 
selfish preference classifications for experiments given late in the semester (and perhaps more 
egalitarian preferences).  Some students might develop a feeling of greater isolation in the 
classroom as the session progresses, and so it is not immediately apparent that students will 
perceive a reduction in social distance as the semester progresses.   
Unfortunately, the present design and data are not suitable to test or distinguish between 
these alternative hypotheses.  These results are, nonetheless, important to those who question the 
viability of classroom points as a reward medium in experiments—subjects exhibit rational 
preferences over an important behavioral concept (fairness) when points are the reward.  The 
results also imply that instructors must use caution in making unqualified comparisons of 
classroom outcomes to comparable research experiments, because unintended confounds may 
exist over the course of an academic session, among other things.  
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TABLE 1:  Violations of WARP 
(violations reported for CCEI<.95) 
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TABLE 2:  Categorizing Subject Preferences 
(Percentage of subjects fitting weak and strong forms of preference type) 
 
  Experiment Treatment 
(Dictator budget sets 6, 7, and 9 removed) 












Selfish  27% (13%)  30% (13%)  41% (9%)  14% (12%) 
Leontief  33% (3%)  47% (3%)  41% (3%)  43% (14%) 
Perfect Substitutes  20% (3%)  3% (3%)  3% (4%)  17% (0%) 
        
TOTALS 
(weak or strong) 
      
Selfish  40.00%  43.33%  50.00%  26.20% 
Leontief  36.67%  50.00%  43.75%  57.10% 
Perfect Substitutes  23.33%  6.67%  6.25%  16.70% 
  
Dictator Offers 
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TABLE 3:  Multinomial logit results:   











Cash Quasi-Double Blind  .03 (.78)  .17 (.07)*  -.20 (.00)*** 
Points Early   .12 (.04)**  .08 (.17)  -.20 (.00)*** 
Points Late  -.16 (.06)*  .23 (.01)***  -.07 (.06)* 
Chi-squared (df=4) = 15.12     (p-value=.004) 










  Directions:  Please fill in all the blanks below.  Make sure the number of tokens listed 
under Hold plus the number listed under Pass equals the total number of tokens available.  
Remember, all points are worth $0.10 (10 cents) to all subjects. 
 
1)  Divide 75 tokens:  Hold _____@ 1 point each, and Pass _____@ 2 points each. 
 
2)  Divide 40 tokens:  Hold _____@ 1 point each, and Pass _____@ 3 points each. 
 
3)  Divide 75 tokens:  Hold _____@ 2 points each, and Pass _____@ 1 point each. 
 
4)  Divide 60 tokens:  Hold _____@ 1 point each, and Pass _____@ 2 points each. 
 
5)  Divide 40 tokens:  Hold _____@ 3 point each, and Pass _____@ 1 point each. 
 
6)  Divide 60 tokens:  Hold _____@ 1 point each, and Pass _____@ 1 point each. 
 
7)  Divide 100 tokens:  Hold _____@ 1 point each, and Pass _____@ 1 point each. 
 
8)  Divide 60 tokens:  Hold _____@ 2 points each, and Pass _____@ 1 point each. 
 
9)  Divide 80 tokens:  Hold _____@ 1 point each, and Pass _____@ 1 point each. 
 
10)  Divide 40 tokens:  Hold _____@ 4 points each, and Pass _____@ 1 point each. 
 
11)  Divide 40 tokens:  Hold _____@ 1 point each, and Pass _____@ 4 points each. 
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ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS APPENDIX (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 
 
INSTRUCTIONS  (DOUBLE-BLIND TREATMENT) 
 
Welcome 
  This is an experiment about decision making.  You will be paid in cash for your 
participation, and the amount of money your will earn depends on the decisions that you and the 
other participants make.  The entire experiment should last less than one hour.  At the end of the 
experiment you will be paid privately and in cash.   
 
Your Identity   
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the 
experiment, nor will any other participant know of your cash payoff in today’s experiment.  Your 
name will never be recorded by anyone.  Neither the experimenter nor the other subjects will be 
able to link you to any of your decisions or to your payoff amount.  In order to keep your 




NOTE:  QUASI-DOUBLE BLIND TREATMENT replaces the sentence “Neither the  
experimenter….. or to your payoff amount.” with the sentence “Neither the 
experimenter nor the other subjects will be able to link you to any of your 
decisions.”  The oral description of the payment procedures also make it clear that 
in Quasi-Double Blind the subjects will have their payoff amount written next to 
their name for accounting purposes only.  Because subjects make two decisions, and 
matching is random with another subject for each decision, it is then impossible to 
discover a subject’s specific decisions, even knowing her final payoff amount.  All 
other instructions are identical between the cash Double-Blind and cash Quasi-






  Attached to this page is a number on a colored piece of paper.  This is your Claim Check.  
Each participant has a different number.  You may want to verify that the number on your Claim 
Check is the same as the number on the top of page 4. 
  You will present your Claim Check to an assistant at the end of the experiment to receive 
your cash payment. 
 
Please remove your Claim Check now and put it is a safe place. 
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EXPERIMENT SPECIFICS 
 
  This experiment will ask you to make a series of choices about how to divide a set of 
tokens between yourself and one other subject.  You and the other subject will be paired 
randomly and you will not be told each other’s identity. 
  As you divide the tokens, you and the other subject will each earn points.  Every point 
that the subjects earn will be worth 10 cents.  For example, if you earn 58 points you will make 
$5.80 in the experiment. 
  Each choice you make is similar to the following: 
Example:  Divide 50 tokens:  Hold _____ @ 1 point each, and Pass _____ @ 2 points each. 
  In this choice you must divide 50 tokens.  You can keep all the tokens, keep some and 
pass some, or pass all the tokens.  In this example, you will receive 1 point for every token you 
hold, and the other player will receive 2 points for every token you pass.  For example, if you 
hold 50 and pass 0 tokens, you will receive 50 points, or 50×$.10=$5.00, and the other player 
will receive no points and $0.  If you hold 0 tokens and pass 50, you will receive $0 and the other 
player will receive 50×2=100 points, or 100×$.10=$10.00.  However, you can choose to hold 
any number of tokens between 0 and 50.  For example, you could choose to hold 29 tokens and 
pass 21.  In this case you would earn 29 points, or 29×$.10=$2.90, and the other subject would 
receive 21×2=42 points, which is 42×$.10=$4.20. 
  Here is one other example: 
Example:  Divide 40 tokens:  Hold _____@ 3 points each, and Pass _____@1 point each. 
  In this example every token you hold earns you 3 points, and every token you pass earns 
the other subject 1 point.  Again, each point you earn is worth $.10 to you, and each point the 
other subject earns is worth $.10 to him/her. 
Important Detail:  In all cases you can choose any number to hold and any number to pass, but 
the number of tokens you hold plus the number of tokens you pass must equal the total number 
of tokens to divide.  Please feel free to use a calculator or paper and pencil to calculate points and 
to assure that all of the tokens have been allocated. 
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EARNING MONEY IN THIS EXPERIMENT 
 
You will be asked to make 11 allocation decisions like the examples we discussed on the 
previous page.  We will calculate your payments as follows:  These payments are independent of 
the initial $5 you received for showing up on time. 
After your and everyone else’s decision forms have been collected, we will shuffle the 
forms and randomly pair your form with that of another subject in this experiment.  Using a table 
of random numbers, we will select one of your decisions to carry out.  You will then get the 
points you allocated in the “hold” portion of your decision, and the other subject will get the 
points you allocated on the “pass” portion of your decision.  These points will be worth 10 cents 
each, as was the case in the examples shown on the previous page.  The earnings from your 
points will be placed in your earnings envelope. 
Next you will be paired again with a different subject in the experiment.  This time we 
will randomly choose one of the other subject’s decisions.  You will earn the points allocated in 
the “pass” portion from the other subject’s decision sheet.  Again these points will be worth 10 
cents each.  Your earnings from this pairing will also be placed in your earnings envelope. 
(Note: half of the subjects will receive their cash payoff from the counterpart’s 
“pass” portion during the first shuffle, and the cash payoff from the “hold” 
portion of their own decision sheet during the second random matching of 
subjects and counterparts.  In any event, each subject will earn a cash payoff 
that results from one of his/her own randomly chosen “pass” decisions, and also 
from one randomly chosen “hold” decision from being matched with a different 
counterpart). 
 
The monitor chosen at the beginning of the experiment will verify tat these procedures 
are followed. 
After all the calculations have been made, another experimenter who was not involved in 
the experiment until this time will ask you to bring up your claim check and will hand you your 
earnings envelope.  This will again help to guarantee your privacy. 
On the following page are the choices we would like you to make for this experiment.  
Please fill out the form, taking the time you need to be accurate.  When all subjects are done we 
will collect the forms. 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation.  
 
 
DECISION SHEET (in preceding Appendix) FOLLOWS THIS PAGE FOR 
SUBJECTS 
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INSTRUCTIONS  (Classroom POINTS TREATMENTS) 
Note: Instruction are the same for the EARLY POINTS and LATE POINTS 
treatments.  The experiments differ only in the timing of the experiment 




  This is an experiment about decision making.  You will be paid in Econ 2030 [micro-
economics principles] class points for your participation in this experiment, and the amount of 
points you will earn depends on the decisions that you and the other participants make.  Each 
class point that you earn in today’s experiment will be added to the points score you receive on 
Exam #1 in our class (with no maximum to the score one could have.  Even if your Exam #1 
score plus today’s class points from the experiment sum to more than 100, I will still include all 
points in determining final grades).  The entire experiment should last about one-half hour.  At 
the end of the experiment you will be informed of your class points privately.   
 
Your Identity 
  You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the 
experiment, nor will any other participant know of your points payoff in today’s experiment.  
Your name will never be recorded in connection with your decisions.  Neither the experimenter 
nor the other subjects will be able to link you to any of your decisions.  In order to keep your 
decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant.   
 
Claim Check 
  Attached to this page is a number on a colored piece of paper.  This is your Claim Check.  
Each participant has a different number.  You may want to verify that the number on your Claim 
Check is the same as the number on the top of page 4. 
  You will present your Claim Check to an assistant at the end of the experiment to receive 
your payment of class points. 
 
Please remove your Claim Check now and put it is a safe place. 
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EXPERIMENT SPECIFICS 
 
  This experiment will ask you to make a series of choices about how to divide a set of 
tokens between yourself and one other subject.  You and the other subject will be paired 
randomly and you will not be told each other’s identity. 
  As you divide the tokens, you and the other subject can each earn class points.  Every 10 
experiment-points (e-points) that the subjects earn will be worth 1 class point.  Equivalently, this 
means that each e-point is worth .10 class points (I will keep track of fractional class points).  For 
example, if you earn 50 e-points you will make 5 class points in the experiment (the equivalent 
of one-half letter grade on Exam #1). 
  Each choice you make is similar to the following: 
Example:  Divide 50 tokens:  Hold _____ @ 1 e-point each, and Pass _____ @ 2 e-points each. 
  In this example choice you must divide 50 tokens.  You can keep all the tokens, keep 
some and pass some, or pass all the tokens.  In this example, you will receive 1 e-point for every 
token you hold, and the other player will receive 2 e-points for every token you pass.  For 
example, if you hold 50 and pass 0 tokens, you will receive 50 e-points, or 50×.10=5 class 
points, and the other player will receive no e-points and therefore no class points.  If you hold 0 
tokens and pass 50, you will receive no class points and the other player will receive 50×2=100 
e-points, or 100×.10=10 class points.  However, you can choose to hold any number of tokens 
between 0 and 50.  For example, you could choose to hold 29 tokens and pass 21.  In this case 
you would earn 29 e-points, or 29×.10=2.9 class points, and the other subject would receive 
21×2=42 e-points, which is 42×.10=4.2 class points. 
  Here is one other example: 
Example:  Divide 40 tokens:  Hold _____@ 3 e-points each, and Pass _____@1 e-point each. 
  In this example every token you hold earns you 3 e-points, and every token you pass 
earns the other subject 1 e-point.  Again, each e-point you earn is worth .10 class points to you, 
and each e-point the other subject earns is worth .10 class points to him/her. 
Important Detail:  In all cases you can choose any number to hold and any number to pass, but 
the number of tokens you hold plus the number of tokens you pass must equal the total number 
of tokens to divide.  Please feel free to use a calculator or paper and pencil to calculate points and 
to assure that all of the tokens have been allocated.  It is also important for you to realize that the 
class points you receive from this experiment will count in the actual determination of your 
grade (that is, each class point earned will be added to your Exam #1 score, with no maximum 
limit—your score can go above 100 if that is the case, and this will still benefit your final point 
and grade total). 
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EARNING CLASS POINTS IN THIS EXPERIMENT 
 
You will be asked to make 11 allocation decisions like the examples we discussed on the 
previous page.  We will calculate your payments as follows:   
After your and everyone else’s decision forms have been collected, we will shuffle the 
forms and randomly pair your form with that of another subject in this experiment.  Using a table 
of random numbers, we will select one of your decisions to carry out.  You will then get the 
tokens and resultant e-points you allocated in the “hold” portion of your decision, and the other 
subject will get the tokens and resultant e-points you allocated on the “pass” portion of your 
decision.  These points will be worth .10 class points each, as was the case in the examples 
shown on the previous page.  These class points earnings will then be written on a slip of paper 
and placed in your earnings envelope. 
Next we will take the decision forms again and you will be paired with a different subject 
in the experiment.  This time we will randomly choose one of the other subject’s decisions.  You 
will receive the tokens and resultant e-points allocated in the “pass” portion from the other 
subject’s decision sheet (and the counterpart gets the tokens and resultant e-points from the 
“hold” portion of his/her decision this time).  Again these points will be worth .10 class points 
each.  Your class points earnings from this pairing will be written on a separate slip of paper and 
also placed in your earnings envelope.   
(Note: half of the subjects will receive the e-points from the counterpart’s 
“pass” portion during the first shuffle, and the e-points from the “hold” portion 
of their own decision sheet during the second random matching of subjects and 
counterparts.  In any event, each subject will earn e-points from one of their 
randomly chosen “pass” decisions, and also from one randomly chosen “hold” 
decision from a matching with a different counterpart). 
 
The monitor(s) chosen at the beginning of the experiment will verify that these 
procedures are followed. 
After all the calculations have been made, another experimenter who was not involved in 
the experiment until this time will ask you to bring up your claim check and will hand you your 
earnings envelope.  I will then record your total class points earnings next to your name.  Note 
that this process helps guarantee the privacy of your decisions.  By using this process, I will 
know only what your final points outcome is, and I will not be able to link your points outcome 
to your individuals decisions, because decisions are only known by claim check number, which I 
will never see and which will never be recorded next to your name (and never be included in the 
data set from this experiment).  In other words, your individual decisions will remain 
anonymous not only to other subjects, but even to me (the experimenter). 
On the following page are the choices we would like you to make for this experiment.  
Please fill out the form, taking the time you need to be accurate.  When all subjects are done we 
will collect the forms. 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation.    24




  Directions:  Please fill in all the blanks below.  Make sure the number of tokens listed 
under Hold plus the number listed under Pass equals the total number of tokens available.  
Remember, all e-points are worth 0.10 class points. 
 
1)  Divide 75 tokens:  Hold _____@ 1 e-point each, and Pass _____@ 2 e-points each. 
 
2)  Divide 40 tokens:  Hold _____@ 1 e-point each, and Pass _____@ 3 e-points each. 
 
3)  Divide 75 tokens:  Hold _____@ 2 e-points each, and Pass _____@ 1 e-point each. 
 
4)  Divide 60 tokens:  Hold _____@ 1 e-point each, and Pass _____@ 2 e-points each. 
 
5)  Divide 40 tokens:  Hold _____@ 3 e-point each, and Pass _____@ 1 e-point each. 
 
6)  Divide 60 tokens:  Hold _____@ 1 e-point each, and Pass _____@ 1 e-point each. 
 
7)  Divide 100 tokens:  Hold _____@ 1 e-point each, and Pass _____@ 1 e-point each. 
 
8)  Divide 60 tokens:  Hold _____@ 2 e-points each, and Pass _____@ 1 e-point each. 
 
9)  Divide 80 tokens:  Hold _____@ 1 e-point each, and Pass _____@ 1 e-point each. 
 
10)  Divide 40 tokens:  Hold _____@ 4 e-points each, and Pass _____@ 1 e-point each. 
 
11)  Divide 40 tokens:  Hold _____@ 1 e-point each, and Pass _____@ 4 e-points each. 
 
 
 